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Abstract. One of the primary policy initiatives instituted in response to the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis is a requirement that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after
January 1 2013 include provisions referred to as Collective Action Clauses or CACs.
These CACs allow for a super-majority of creditors to impose restructuring terms on
minority holdouts. This article assesses the likely effect of this proposal on the borrowing
costs of sovereign debtors. Contrary to much of the literature, we find that the presence of
CACs leads to a lower cost of capital, especially for below-investment grade bonds.
JEL Classification: F34, F36, G15, G12, H63, K12
1. Introduction
In the wake of Greece’s first bailout in mid-2010, and with problems in
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal looming on the horizon, politicians in the
richer Eurozone nations came under increasing pressure from an angry
public to make policy changes that would mitigate the need for future
bailouts. One of the primary policy reforms, announced in a statement by
the Eurogroup on November 28 2010, was to require all Eurozone sovereign
bonds issued after January 1 2013 to include Collective Action Clauses or
CACs (Hall, Peel, and Chaffin, 2010). These clauses allow for a super-
majority of creditors to impose restructuring terms on minority holdout
creditors. Although the goal of this mandate is to reduce the costs of
restructuring financially troubled sovereigns, there is considerable debate
as to whether the savings of ex post restructuring costs will be overwhelmed
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by an increase in ex ante borrowing costs (Eichengreen, 2003; Portes, 2004).
On the positive side, CACs facilitate the coordination of dispersed investors
and thereby reduce the effectiveness of holdouts, which makes restructurings
easier for sovereign debtors. On the negative side, if restructurings are made
easier, debtor sovereigns might be encouraged to engage in excessive bor-
rowing, and behave more irresponsibly after the debt has been issued
(Ghosal and Thampanishvong, 2010; Pitchford and Wright, 2010).
Overall, the impact of CACs on the pricing of sovereign debt is ambiguous.
The existing empirical evidence regarding the effect of CACs on the yields
to sovereign debt is also ambiguous. Part of this ambiguity is due to the data
limitation that prior researchers were forced to labor under. In particular,
prior researchers faced two dilemmas.
First, much of the existing research is based on data prior to 2003—a
period in which a significant portion of the market for sovereign bonds
did not contain CACs; specifically bonds issued under New York law.
Researchers attempted to correct for this deficiency in the data by comparing
yields on bonds issued under New York law (without CACs) with those
issued under English law (which almost universally contained CACs).
However, this comparison is inappropriate because the standard New
York and English law bonds at the time differed in many ways other than
the inclusion of CACs.
Second, many of the prior studies used the governing law under which a
bond was issued as a proxy for whether the bond contained a CAC provi-
sion. However, as demonstrated later, CAC provisions vary considerably,
even within a particular governing jurisdiction and a dichotomous indicator
(dummy variable) cannot adequately capture the effects of these differences.
This article makes two contributions to the empirical literature on sover-
eign debt. First, we provide the first detailed analysis of the variations in
CAC terms for bonds issued under London and New York laws during the
period 1990–2010. Contrary to the assumptions made in prior work, we
demonstrate that there is wide variation in CAC provisions, even within
these two jurisdictions.
Second, we find that, whether written under either New York or English
law, the presence of CACs reduces the when-issued spreads of sovereign
debt, and that this reduction is greater the weaker the financial condition
of the issuing country. This result is contrary to prior research that finds
either no pricing effect from including CACs or finds that including CACs
increases the cost of capital for weaker nations and decreases the cost of
capital for stronger ones. Further, our results hold not just for the difference
between bonds containing provisions requiring unanimous votes to change
key bond terms versus those requiring super-majority votes (the question
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addressed by prior research), but also for the other variations in CAC terms
that make them more or less amenable to restructurings.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
classic holdout problem associated with sovereign debt. Section 3 describes
the prior literature. Sections 4 and 5 discuss our database and provide
summary statistics. Section 6 describes the various forms of CACs and
sets out our predictions as to their likely effects on a sovereign’s cost of
capital. Section 7 reports our main empirical results. Section 8 supplements
these results with a discussion of recent sovereign restructurings and notes
the extent that the restructured debt relies on CACs. Section 9 concludes.
2. Background: The Holdout Problem with Sovereign Debt
The term CAC refers to a range of contract terms, each of which operates to
ameliorate the problem of holdout creditors (Buchheit, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c;
Gelpern, 2003; Drage and Hovaguimian, 2004). To understand the relevance
of the holdout problem in the sovereign debt context, it is instructive to keep
in mind three things. First, there is no bankruptcy regime for sovereigns.
Thus, there is no bankruptcy-type process whereby a judge supervises a
restructuring and, under certain conditions, can impose a restructuring
plan on all holdouts (Sachs, 2003).1 Second, restructuring a sovereign’s
debt will necessarily involve a third party, be it a member of the “Official
Sector” (the Eurogroup, the ECB, the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, etc.) or
countries that would be most affected by a potential default, which, inciden-
tally, may not even be a creditor of the debtor nation. An implication of this
second factor is that sovereign debt contracts will be written so as to antici-
pate and facilitate a subsequent restructuring by a third party, which might
explain why the Eurozone has mandated the inclusion of CACs in all newly
issued bonds.
Finally, prior to 2003, the standard practice in sovereign bonds written
under New York law had long been for bondholder rights to be individual
rather than collective (Gelpern and Gulati, 2006). Consequently, any modi-
fication of the debt contract such as reducing or delaying the payment ob-
ligation must be negotiated with each bondholder individually. Thus, even if
a majority of bondholders who had originally lent to the sovereign as part of
a single bond issue agreed that it would be beneficial to grant the debtor
some relief, an individual bondholder could refuse to do so and hold out
for her promised amount, and thus frustrating the attempted reorganization.
1 A procedure similar to the so-called cram down provisions of Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.
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In a world with a small number of bondholders, all of whom know each other
and have repeated interactions, individual negotiations would not pose a
serious problem. However, as the number of bondholders increases, and
they become more autonomous and dispersed, the holdout problem can
become severe. The problem is exacerbated by investors who specialize in
taking a position in an issue for the sole purpose of holding out and demand-
ing a disproportionate payment in exchange for their bonds.2 Essentially, to
renegotiate the terms of an entire outstanding bond issue, a sovereign must
obtain unanimous and simultaneous agreement from all of the outstanding
bondholders. As long as there is the possibility of holdouts, all bondholders
have an incentive to refuse to accept a payoff for anything less than the
original obligation, which would frustrate any restructuring attempt.3
CACs ameliorate the holdout problem in a variety of ways. Most import-
ant are those that permit the modification of payment terms for the entire
issue if a pre-specified fraction of the outstanding bondholders (in value)
agree to the restructuring plan, making it harder for particular subsets of
creditors to institute litigation that might disrupt the reorganization process,
or forcing any creditor recovering a disproportionate payment to share it
proportionally with the others. Essentially, CACs obviate the need for indi-
vidual bargaining and permit renegotiations via the collective actions on the
part of a subset of the outstanding bondholders.
The most frequently used CAC applies to the modification of payment
terms. These “modification CACs” come in a variety of forms depending
on the percentage of votes needed to change the bond’s payment terms.
Although 75% is the typical requirement today, there are modification
CACs that require a favorable vote by as many as 85% and as few as
18.75% of the outstanding bondholders.4 The CACs mandated by the
Eurozone require a minimum of 66.67% of the vote to change payment terms.
In addition to setting minimum voting requirements, there are other im-
portant features of CACs that have the potential to affect the holdout
problem. Some modification CACs allow for the vote to occur in writing
whereas others require a bondholder meeting. CACs also vary in terms of
restrictions on who can vote on a restructuring plan. Some bonds allow the
issuer carte blanche in voting, whereas others restrict the issuer’s ability to
vote the bonds it holds or controls.
2 These specialist holdouts are referred to by a number of names, including “vulture cred-
itors” or, more euphemistically, “distressed debt investors”.
3 Of course, the time value of money and legal fees are deterrents to holdouts.
4 As we explain later, the 18.75% vote typically is applied only if an initial quorum re-
quirement is not satisfied.
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Other CACs seek to ameliorate the holdout problem by means other than
voting requirements. These CACs apply to matters such as the acceleration
of payments and the criteria as to who has standing to sue a financially
impaired sovereign.
The incentives of Official Sector institutions to encourage a shift to CACs
are clear. The presence of a CAC reduces the costs of restructuring a dis-
tressed sovereign debtor. By implication, that reduces the amount of Official
Sector support that is needed. To avoid the negative externalities of a
complete or partial default, the Official Sector often feels compelled to
provide complete bailouts (Eichengreen and Ruhl, 2001). But the taxpayers
of the countries providing the funds are inevitably annoyed at having to
subsidize either sovereigns who over-borrow or financiers who over-lend.
CACs provide a way to diminish the wrath of the taxpayers somewhat in
that they impose some of the costs of the bailout on private creditors.
Given that CACs are a way of shifting some of the costs of financial
distress on to private creditors, the question is whether including CACs
will necessarily increase the cost of borrowing in the private markets.
Indeed, some commentators in the context of the current Eurozone crisis
have blamed the announcement of the CAC initiative in late 2010 for the
precipitous rise in yields for the weaker Eurozone nations that took place
around the same time (Alphandery, 2011; De Grauwe, 2011). But this con-
clusion is not obvious because the increased likelihood of haircuts for private
bondholders (in addition to any increased propensity on the part of the
debtor to ask for a restructuring) has to be balanced by the savings that
result from a lower cost of restructuring (lower cost because CACs reduce
the costs of dealing with holdout creditors).
The current Eurozone proposal to include CACs in all sovereign debt
issues by Eurozone members is reminiscent of the U.S. Treasury’s initiative
on CACs from roughly a decade ago (2002–03). The result of this initiative
was the widespread shift in New York law bonds, staring in early 2003, from
requiring unanimous consent from bondholders for any alteration of
payment terms to the use of a 75% vote requirement to alter payment
terms (Taylor, 2007; Bradley et al., 2010). Prior to this initiative, only
bonds governed by English law, for the most part, contained 75% modifi-
cation CAC provisions; virtually no bonds governed by New York law con-
tained such CACs prior to 2003 (Liu, 2002; Eichengreen, 2003). Figure 1
shows the shift in the use of CACs written under New York law that
occurred starting in 2003.
Figure 2 reports the dollar value of the issues. Note that although there
were issues prior to 1993, the dollar amounts are too small to be seen in the
graph. However, the patterns are roughly the same in the two graphs: 2003
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marks the beginning of the tsunami of CACs whether in terms of the number
of issuances or dollar amount.
When sovereigns began adopting CACs in 2003 (or modifying old CACs),
they fashioned the types of clauses they (presumably) thought best suited
their needs. The result was more variation in the types of CACs in the
market than had existed before (Gelpern and Gulati, 2009). The dominant
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Figure 2. Total value of bonds issued under New York law with and without CACs
(millions of current U.S. Dollars).
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Figure 1. Total number of bonds issued under New York law with and without CACs.
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model that emerged from these proposed reforms requires a 75% voter
approval, in dollar amount. The Euro CAC initiative is designed to shift
the costs of a restructuring yet again, and in the direction of moving further
away from individual rights (Clifford Chance, 2012). Two aspects of the
Euro CAC model are key. First, it reduces the vote requirement for
altering payment terms from the existing market standard of 75% to
66.67% for an individual bond. Second, the Euro CACs add a new
feature that was part of the G-10 recommendations in 2002, but was not
adopted by more than a handful of issuers under New York law. This new
feature enables aggregated voting whereby modification of payment terms in
all of the sovereign’s bonds occurs simultaneously so long as an overall vote
of 75% across the different series of bonds is achieved and a minimum vote
of 66.67% is reached in each individual bond.5
3. Prior Literature
The earliest CAC pricing studies were based on comparisons of the yields on
English law bonds and New York law bonds (Petas and Rahman, 1999;
Tsatsaronis, 1999). These studies assumed that all bonds within a given
legal jurisdiction were identical, and that the differences in bond terms
between legal jurisdictions (in particular, New York and England)
involved the difference in the vote required to alter the payment terms on
these bonds. The basic findings reported in these studies are similar. The
studies failed to find significant price differences among bonds issued under
different governing laws. The conclusion was that CACs had no meaningful
impact on the pricing of sovereign debt.
Subsequent studies using better data and more sophisticated empirical
techniques still found little in the way of any pricing effects of CACs
(Becker, Richards, Thaicharoen, 2003; Weinschelbaum and Wynne, 2005).
This was not the general finding throughout the literature, however.
Perhaps, the best known study that came to contradictory conclusions was
by Eichengreen and Mody (2004), who found that for riskier issuers, the cost
of borrowing increased with the use of CACs, but for financially sound
issuers, CACs reduced the cost of borrowing. These authors argued that
5 Based on conversations with market participants, our understanding is that the change in
voting threshold has been of particular concern in the weaker and smaller nations in the
Eurozone. That is, nations like Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Slovakia will
probably have to issue most of their new debt in foreign law bonds. The strong issuers,
such as Germany are able to issue under local law and CACs are unlikely to make much of
a difference for these countries.
CACS FORTHEEUROZONE 7
 at D
uke U
niversity on July 21, 2014
http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
the increased flexibility that came with the English-style modification pro-
visions was most valuable for those nations least in need of demonstrating
credibility (financially sound nations). For if these credible nations should
need to be restructured in the future, bondholders would want to make the
process as easy as possible. In contrast, for the less credible nations, a unan-
imity (highly inflexible) voting rule was needed to convince creditors that
these nations were committed to repaying their debts.6 Importantly, the
authors in this second group of studies did not all assume that New York
law bonds were identical in terms of lacking CACs and that English law
bonds were identical in their use of CACs. In particular, Gugiatti and
Richards (2004) found that there had in fact been a subset of bonds issued
by relatively small and obscure issuers under New York law that had been
using CACs for a number of years already. Incorporating corrections for this
small subset of exceptional bonds into their analyses did not, however,
change the any of their basic results.
The most recent paper dealing with the pricing of CACs is a Banca d’Italia
working paper by Bardozzetti and Dottori (2013), hereafter B&D. This
manuscript differs from much of the prior research in two significant
ways: the paper does not use governing law as a proxy for the absence or
presence of a modification CAC. Rather it uses Bloomberg’s coding of the
absence or presence of a modification CAC; and it uses secondary market, as
opposed to primary market, data. B&D find, unlike the prior research, a U-
shaped pricing effect. In other words, CACs have little impact on the cost of
capital for the highest rated issuers and the lowest rated issuers, but reduce
the cost of capital for those in the middle range.
Our methodology differs in three significant ways from that employed by
B&D. First, although the B&D study improves upon prior work in that it
does not use governing law as a proxy for the type of contract terms being
used, it still only looks at the effect of a single contract term, the modifica-
tion CAC, and ignores the variation among the different types of modifica-
tion CACs. Second, based on our findings, the type of 0–1 coding of the
CAC variable that B&D use is potentially problematic in the post-2003 era
because almost all bonds issued under foreign laws during that period con-
tained CACs and it was only the bonds under local laws that lacked CACs.
This suggests that what B&D might have identified is a foreign-law versus a
6 The Eichengreen and Mody results are broadly consistent with the observation that
creditors seem to demand tougher and tighter contract provisions from weaker issuers
(Mody, 2004; Bradley and Roberts, 2004).
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local-law pricing effect, rather than a CAC effect.7 We correct for this
problem by examining the effects of different types of CACs within individ-
ual legal regimes. Third, B&D use secondary market data. In contrast, fol-
lowing the majority of the prior literature, we use primary market data.
To elaborate on this last point, in a host of applications, secondary market
data, in theory, has some advantages over primary market data. If markets
are efficient, the prices of actively traded securities provide an unbiased
estimate of a security’s intrinsic value. But the sovereign debt market is
relatively illiquid; rarely do these bonds trade in the secondary market.
Reflecting this illiquidity, B&D are forced to use the average of bid and
ask rates instead of traded prices. Thus, the question to be asked is
whether the average of the bid/ask rates in the secondary market is a
better indicator of the price of covenants than the when-issued rate. More
directly, which is a better measure of a sovereign’s cost of capital: the when-
issued rate (established through negotiations with informed agents) or the
average of the bid and ask rates in the aftermarket? It is not clear that
the latter is the better measure. Indeed, we argue that the when-issued rate
is the appropriate measure of a sovereign’s cost of capital.
The bid price reflects the highest price that a dealer in the market would be
willing to sell the security in question and the ask price is the lowest price
that a dealer would be willing to buy the security, and in most instances they
are not the same individual (financial institution). Therefore, the bid/ask
rates may reflect the opinion of only one or two dealers—indeed, the most
optimistic and the most pessimistic dealers in the market. Moreover, the bid/
ask rates are for a pre-specified amount of a security that could be purchased
at the ask price or sold at the bid price by a potential investor. In contrast,
the when-issued rate reflects the price at which the entire issue is sold to the
public. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the due diligence of informed buyers
(institutions) at the time of issuance reflects the most informed opinion as to
the value of the covenants (including CACs) contained in the security being
sold. Additionally, the paucity of data (even for bid/ask rates) forces B&D to
confine their analysis to the 5-year period 2007–11—the period for which
these data are available. As shown in Figure 1, almost all bonds written
under New York Law contained CACs after 2003, which reduces the
ability of their analysis to say anything about the significance of the emer-
gence of CACs.
Even if researchers were able to observe actual traded prices in the sec-
ondary market, these rates would not be measures of a sovereign’s cost of
7 The effect they find is similar to that found in Choi, Gulati, Posner (2013) with respect to
Greek local law bonds (lacking CACs) versus Greek English law bonds (containing CACs).
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capital. A sovereign’s cost of capital is given by the rate negotiated at the
time of issuance. Only then can we observe the ex ante pricing of the cov-
enants contained in a particular issue. Once an issue is “sold to the public,”
prices in the secondary market are irrelevant to the sovereign’s cost of
capital, unless of course it expects to issue additional debt in the near
future. To see this more clearly, consider the moral hazard problem
associated with sovereign debt. At the time of issuance, market participants
would evaluate the extent of the moral hazard problem given the financial
condition of the issuer and the security’s covenants. Now, assume that after
the security has been issued, the sovereign begins to act opportunistically.
When market participants become aware of the sovereign’s malfeasance, the
price of the security will fall (rates will rise); but this fall in price has abso-
lutely no effect on the sovereign’s cost of capital, which was established at
the time the security was issued in the primary market. Put differently, the
pricing of sovereign debt in the secondary market reflects the ex post
behavior of the sovereign, which again, has no effect on the sovereign’s ex
ante cost of capital. Finally, the vast majority of sovereign debt is sold at par,
which means that the coupon is probably a good estimate of a sovereign’s
cost of capital.8
We are aware of only one paper that uses both primary and secondary
market data (Becker, Richards, Thaicharoen, 2003). After extolling the
virtues of secondary market data they, like B&D, calculate the average of
the bid/ask rates in the secondary market and interpret these rates as the
sovereign’s cost of capital. Not surprisingly, using the average of the bid/ask
rates, Becker et al. find results consistent with those of B&D—overall, CACs
do not appear to be priced by the market. However, when they replicate
their analysis using primary (when-issued) market data, they get results
similar to ours: CACs are associated with lower when-issue rates, and only
for low-rated bonds.
8 Discussions with practitioners suggest that, because of complications arising from tax
treatments, sovereign bonds of the type that we examine (foreign-law governed) are almost
always issued at par. That said, researchers have found instances where sovereigns have
tried to manipulate the coupon rates on the face of their bonds to help satisfy external
benchmarks (e.g., those imposed by the IMF or the Maastricht Treaty) (Dias, Richmond,
Wright, 2011). These manipulations can occur in a variety of ways, including adjusting the
fees paid to financial institutions, using implicit guarantees from third parties, and issuing
the bonds at a discount. While our understanding is that these manipulations are rare in the
context of the foreign-law bonds, our analysis is vulnerable to the criticism that we have not
fully corrected for them.
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4. Database
Our empirical analyses are based on a dataset taken from the sales docu-
ments of sovereign debt issuances, which are available from the Thomson
One Banker and Perfect Information databases and cover the period
January 1 1990, through December 31 2010. We exclude data beyond 2010
because the data from 2011 and 2012 are likely to have been heavily
influenced by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In particular, we are re-
sponding to a concern that the overall shift in market sentiment that
occurred during these two crisis years might be driving our results. There
is a general notion that during this time period, debt issued by emerging
sovereigns was underpriced, whereas debt issued by developed sovereigns
was overpriced.
Because the actual contracts are usually not available, we rely on the sales
documents (prospectuses, prospectus supplements, and offering circulars).
These documents describe the key contract terms of the issue. There are two
reasons to expect that the sales documents accurately represent the actual
contract terms. First, market participants themselves use these sales docu-
ments as their primary source of information regarding the contract terms of
each issue. Second, issuers and underwriters face the risk of liability for
inaccurate disclosures.
The Thomson One Banker and Perfect Information databases are two of
the most extensive collections of offering circulars and prospectuses for sov-
ereign debt issues. However, they are not an exhaustive set. In particular, we
suspect that there is a bias toward including bonds that are likely to be of
interest to cross-border investors. One indication of this is the fact that the
two databases contain relatively few bonds governed by local laws.
The two databases contain a small number of documents pertaining to
sovereign issuances governed by laws other than those of New York and
England, particularly Germany, Switzerland, and France. We excluded these
data for two reasons. First, there are very few issuances for most of these
jurisdictions; the exception being Germany. Second, even for Germany,
there are almost no issuances for the post-2002 period, which is an important
focus of our analysis. Figure 3 presents the overall distributions of the bonds
by governing law. The figure shows the dominance of New York law and
English law bonds in the post-2002 period, and also the disappearance of the
German law bonds in 2001.9
9 The increase in local-law bonds, we suspect, is largely the result of Eurozone countries
beginning to issue to foreign investors under their local laws.
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The source databases also contains a small number of bonds governed by
the local laws of the issuer. Again, we exclude these observations because
there are so few. The issuers for whom we have data over the period 1990–
2011 include over 75 nations and range from issuers who access the market
regularly, such as Mexico and Brazil, to those nations who rarely access the
market, such as Ghana, Vietnam, and Nigeria.
Until about 1990, the sovereign bond market was dominated by a small
number of high-rated issuers such as Norway, Sweden, and Japan. In the
post-1990 period, the market expanded, with more variation in the quality of
issuers who were able to access the market. Our dataset also includes a small
number of bonds for quasi-sovereigns such as the handful of central banks,
foreign cities, and states that effected international issuances during the
period under study, and for whom information was available from
Thomson and Perfect Information. For example, in the 1990s, the Greek
Central Bank was the primary conduit through which the Hellenic Republic
issued bonds. For purposes of our study, we treat the Central Bank bonds as
the equivalent of bonds issued by the Hellenic Republic. For the 1990–2011
period, and particularly for the 2003–11 sub-period, there are but a handful
of these bonds.
Table I presents the countries and the number of bonds issued by each in
our New York and English bond samples. All of our empirical analyses are
based on these data. As discussed earlier, we do not include British data
beyond 2010 in our regression models so as to avoid the risk of our results
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Figure 3. Total number of issues by governing law.
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Table I. 1990–2011 Sample
New York bonds English bonds
Issuer Freq. Issuer Freq.
Argentina 18 Abu Dhabi 2
Aruba 2 Albania 2
Australia 1 Argentina 16
Austria 2 Austria 18
Bahamas 2 Bahrain 2
Belize 5 Barbados 7
Bosnia 2 Belarus 2
Brazil 36 Belgium 18
Bulgaria 5 Brazil 2
Chile 10 Croatia 18
China 13 Cuba 3
Colombia 23 Cyprus 11
Congo 1 Czech 10
Costa Rica 8 Denmark 18
Dominican Republic 5 Dubai 6
Ecuador 3 Estonia 1
Egypt 5 Fiji 1
El Salvador 11 Finland 25
Finland 3 Georgia 2
Gabon 1 Ghana 1
Greece 1 Greece 31
Grenada 2 Hungary 5
Guatemala 4 Iceland 18
Hungary 5 Iran 2
Iceland 1 Ireland 9
Indonesia 7 Japan 12
Iraq 1 Jordan 1
Ireland 1 Kazakhstan 2
Israel 8 Latvia 7
Italy 32 Lebanon 7
Jamaica 16 Lithuania 20
Japan 4 Macedonia 2
Kazakhstan 1 Malaysia 1
Korea 11 Mauritius 1
Lebanon 14 Mexico 1
Malaysia 7 Moldova 2
Mexico 48 Montenegro 2
Micronesia 1 Morocco 3
Panama 20 New Zealand 7
Peru 9 Nigeria 1
Philippines 27 Norway 11
Poland 8 Oman 1
Portugal 7 Pakistan 7
Qatar 7 Philippines 12
South Africa 14 Poland 19
(continued)
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being driven by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that, by late 2010, had hit
a large portion of the European market.
5. Variables and Summary Statistics
5.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Our dependent variable is the spread between the offering yield and the cor-
responding U.S. Treasury rate with the same maturity. Employing the spread
relative to U.S. bonds, instead of simple yields, accounts, to some extent, for
the state of the economy or stage in the business cycle. We express the spreads
as percentages, that is, 5% is coded as 5.0. We exclude the relatively small
number of floating rate bonds that were issued during the sample period.
5.2 PRIMARY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
We examine the effects of six factors that are designed to reduce the holdout
problem associated with sovereign debt issues. Our primary explanatory
variable is the minimum percentage of bondholders required to change the
Table I. (Continued)
New York bonds English bonds
Issuer Freq. Issuer Freq.
Spain 1 Portugal 19
Sri Lanka 1 Romania 6
Sweden 1 Russia 15
Thailand 2 Senegal 1
Trinidad and Tobago 5 Serbia 2
Tunisie 3 Seychelles 3
Turkey 24 Slovakia 8
Uruguay 25 Slovenia 3
Venezuela 24 South Africa 2
Vietnam 1 Spain 7
Sri Lanka 1
Sweden 37
Thailand 2
Trinidad and Tobago 2
Tunisie 4
Turkey 15
Ukraine 8
Venezuela 1
Total 499 Total 485
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payment terms of an outstanding bond issue. Throughout the article, we
designate this variable as Vote. Thus, for bonds that do not contain a modi-
fication CAC, Vote is coded as 1.0. Investment is set equal to 1 if the bond
rating is of investment grade and 0 if it is below. The variable Meet is set
equal to 1 if the vote must take place at an actual meeting of the bondholders
and 0 otherwise.10 We also construct a series of indicator variables depend-
ing on whether the bond (1) includes a right to accelerated payments, which
can be an individual right, or a collective right if 10% or 25% of the holders
have to agree—an accelerated collective action clause (ACC); (2) includes a
provision restricting the issuer from voting bonds it “owns or controls”—a
disenfranchisement clause (Disen); and (3) has a either a trustee or a bond-
holder committee that can act on behalf of all the bondholders of a certain
issue—a collective representation clause (CRC).
Tables II–VII report the summary statistics of our dependent and
independent variables. Table II–IV report the data from 1990 to 2011 and
Table V–VII report the data from the shorter period 2003 to 2011.
The data in Table II–IV reveal that the mean Spread for the New York
law bonds is higher than the Spread for the English law bonds (2.93% vs.
1.65%). This is consistent with the greater percentage of investment grade
bonds in the latter subset (77% vs. 37%). The minimum percentage of bonds
required to change payment terms (Vote) is higher for the New York sample,
reflecting the number of unanimity CACs in the earlier (pre-2003) period.
The simple correlation between Vote and Spread is insignificant for both
samples over this period. Finally, as a data check, the correlations
between Investment and Spread are negatively related in both samples.
Similar to the full sample, the data in Table V–VII show that the mean
Spread for the New York bonds is higher than the English bonds in the
subset of observations over the 2003–11 period (2.84% vs. 1.81%), again
reflecting the greater percentage of investment grade bonds in the latter
sample (80% vs. 38%). The mean percentage of Vote is 75% in the New
10 Note that this variable is only relevant to the English law issues. Most bonds today
allow the sovereign the option of either using a written resolution process or calling a
physical meeting of the bondholders. This creates a complication in assigning a value to
the Vote variable because while the vote required at a meeting is typically lower than that
required from a written resolution, meetings present the risk of exacerbating creditor
holdout problems (and sovereigns generally prefer to avoid creditor meetings). In light of
the foregoing, we use the following strategy for estimating the Vote variable. We first look
to whether the bond allows for modification via a written resolution. If so, we use the
minimum vote required via the written resolution as our measure for Vote. Only if voting
via a written resolution is not permitted, do we go to the second step of looking at the
requirements for quorums at bondholder meetings.
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York sample, consistent with Figure 1 which shows that essentially all New
York bonds issued after 2002 contained a 75% voting requirement to change
contract terms. This is also reflected in the zero correlation between Vote and
Spread, indicating that the former is essentially a constant in this sample. To
isolate the effect of Vote on Spread, we use a set of control variables that
proxy for other effects that might impact spreads.
Table IV. Correlation matrix: English Law bonds 1990–2011
Spread Vote Investment Meeting Disenfranchisement Acceleration Trustee
Spread 1.00
Vote 0.03 1.00
Investment 0.44 0.08 1.00
Meeting 0.03 0.58 0.04 1.00
Disenfranchisement 0.07 0.65 0.19 0.53 1.00
Acceleration 0.16 0.57 0.11 0.57 0.58 1.00
Trustee/Committee 0.09 0.73 0.07 0.64 0.72 0.69 1.00
Table II. Summary statistics 1990–2011
Variables
Panel 1: NY bonds Panel 2: English bonds
Observations Mean/Percent SD Observations Mean/Percent SD
Spread 419.00 2.93 2.05 373.00 1.65 2.30
Vote 468.00 0.87 0.14 409.00 0.32 0.23
Investment 476.00 0.37 0.48 460.00 0.77 0.42
Meeting 497.00 0.04 0.19 481.00 0.65 0.48
Disenfranchisement 393.00 0.40 0.49 332.00 0.28 0.45
Acceleration 420.00 0.70 0.46 407.00 0.51 0.50
Trustee/Committee 395.00 0.10 0.31 332.00 0.41 0.49
Table III. Correlation matrix: New York law bonds 1990–2011
Spread Vote Investment Meeting Disenfranchisement Acceleration Trustee
Spread 1.00
Vote 0.02 1.00
Investment –0.51 0.01 1.00
Meeting 0.04 –0.15 –0.14 1.00
Disenfranchisement –0.09 –0.71 0.06 –0.17 1.00
Acceleration 0.13 –0.33 –0.31 –0.15 0.37 1.00
Trustee/committee –0.02 –0.16 –0.11 –0.06 0.20 0.16 1.00
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5.3 CONTROL VARIABLES
5.3.a. Credit ratings
Roughly speaking, sovereign credit ratings provide an estimate of the sov-
ereign’s likelihood of default, although governments might exert pressure in
the form of veiled threats of regulation and “investigations into practices”
Table V. Summary statistics 2003–2011
Variables
Panel 1: NY bonds Panel 2: English bonds
Observations Mean/Percent SD Observations Mean/Percent SD
Spread 225.00 2.84 1.85 194.00 1.81 2.22
Vote 221.00 0.75 0.07 182.00 0.45 0.25
Investment 243.00 0.38 0.49 235.00 0.80 0.40
Meeting 250.00 0.04 0.19 248.00 0.41 0.49
Disenfranchisement 202.00 0.77 0.42 184.00 0.45 0.50
Acceleration 218.00 0.83 0.38 222.00 0.73 0.45
Trustee/Committee 199.00 0.17 0.37 185.00 0.62 0.49
Table VII. Correlation matrix: English law bonds 2003–2011
Spread Vote Investment Meeting Disenfranchisement Acceleration Trustee
Spread 1.00
Vote 0.08 1.00
Investment 0.29 0.15 1.00
Meeting 0.08 0.45 0.15 1.00
Disenfranchisement 0.03 0.54 0.26 0.40 1.00
Acceleration 0.01 0.51 0.08 0.60 0.47 1.00
Trustee/Committee 0.02 0.68 0.07 0.55 0.61 0.54 1.00
Table VI. Correlation matrix: New York Law Bonds 2003–2011
Spread Vote Investment Meeting Disenfranchisement Acceleration Trustee
Spread 1.00
Vote 0.00 1.00
Investment 0.45 0.11 1.00
Meeting 0.05 0.03 0.13 1.00
Disenfranchisement 0.15 0.30 0.20 0.40 1.00
Acceleration 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.09 1.00
Trustee/Committee 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.04 1.00
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(as evidenced by the recent spat between S&P and the U.S. government) or
seek to “compensate” (bribe) the rating agencies to present optimistic pro-
spects of the issuer’s future by presenting its financial position in the most
favorable light. Of course traders are aware of this possibility and take this
into consideration when pricing new issues. Nevertheless, we expect that the
ratings are an indication of underlying quality and that higher ratings are
associated with a lower cost of capital.
Our ratings are taken from S&P, one of the three primary rating agencies
for sovereign debt.11 We divide the bond ratings into six categories (AAA,
AA, A, BBB, BB, and B), which combine ratings of pluses and minuses into
these respective six categories.
To determine the extent to which our ratings variable is related to the
financial condition of the issuing sovereign, we run an Ordered-Logit
Regression in which the dependent variable is the ratings’ categories
defined above. We arbitrarily assign the value of 1 to our lowest category
(B) and a value of 6 to our highest category (AAA). We also entertain the
independent variables suggested by the literature (Cantor and Packer, 1996;
Afonso, Gomes, and Packer, 2007).
As Table VIII shows, our ratings categories are significantly related to the
variables that are typically cited when describing a country’s financial con-
dition. For example, a country’s bond rating is negatively related to its ratio
of debt to GNP, GDP Growth, and Debt Service to Exports ratio.12 The
only counter intuitive relation is the positive relation between ratings and the
ratio of domestic credit to GNP. We speculate, however, that this variable is
a proxy for developed economies (countries), whose bonds are typically
higher rated.
5.3.b. Number of banks
Sovereign offerings often differ in terms of the investor groups to whom they
are targeted. Some issuances are targeted to small groups of sophisticated
investors, whereas others seek to attract a broader bondholder base. The risk
of encountering a problem with holdouts is likely to differ as a function of
the nature of the investor base. The smaller and more concentrated the
11 We used the S&P ratings because they have the most extensive set of ratings of the three
major rating agencies (the other two being Moodys and Fitch).
12 We believe that the negative relation between growth and ratings is due to the following.
First, emerging countries (non-investment grade) often have periods of GDP growth that
are much larger than the rates for any OECD countries (investment grade). Second, the
emerging countries also often have periods of low growth or even negative growth rates. As
Barro (2006) shows, non-OECD countries have similar average growth rates to OECD
countries but the non-OECD countries have a larger variance.
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investor base, the lower the risk of holdout problems. The number of banks
involved in the offering provides a proxy for the dispersion of the investor
base because each bank is likely targeting a different investor group.
5.3.c. Size of offering
Another factor that can influence the pricing of a bond is its liquidity. Other
things equal, investors prefer more liquidity. The size of an offering provides
a likely measure of the liquidity of the bond.
5.3.d. Shelf/private offering
There are two regulatory structures for bonds governed by U.S. law. The
larger and more frequent issuers typically use a structure called a “shelf
offering”. Shelf offerings tend to be done by the most established issuers,
who register a whole series of bonds at one time and “place them on the
shelf.” These issuers then take a portion of the issue “off the shelf” and issue
them whenever they believe market conditions to be favorable. The issuers
that do not use shelf registrations almost all use private offerings, which are
offerings restricted to small subgroups of investors (typically, those
qualifying as “sophisticated” under the rules of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission). The Shelf/Private Offering variable tends to be
correlated with offering size. Hence, we use the former in tests involving
Table VIII. Ordered-logit model of bond ratings
The dependent variable is the sovereign’s debt rating and ranges from 1 (B: the lowest
rating) to 6 (AAA: the highest rating category). *Significance at the 10% level,
**Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Coefficient Z statistic
Debt/GNP 0.05 10.55***
GDP growth 44.08 5.82***
Debt service/exports 0.04 5.34***
Standard deviation of export growth 0.04 2.14**
Standard deviation of export growth squared 0.00 2.01**
Reserves/imports 0.00 1.02
Debt rescheduled in previous year 0.61 2.10**
Reserves/short-term debt 0.00 1.37
Short-term debt/total debt 0.02 1.71
Reserves/GDP 0.00 0.12
Domestic credit/GNP 0.01 8.63***
Observations 914
Pseudo R-squared 0.27
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bonds issued under New York law and the latter in tests involving the
English law bonds.
6. The Various Forms of CACs
Having described our sample, we now elaborate on the distinctions among
the various forms of CACs, which, as defined earlier, are our primary inde-
pendent variables, and their frequency of use through time. There is consid-
erable variation in the type of CACs that have been adopted by issuers in the
post-2002 period. A question of relevance to the current Euro CAC initiative
is whether market participants price the various forms of CACs differently.
One would expect that they would since they provide different degrees of
vulnerability to the holdout problem. For example, an 85% vote require-
ment for changes to payment terms versus an 18.75% requirement should be
relevant to investors and be reflected in the required rate of interest. Further,
an 18.75% vote requirement will operate differently depending on whether
the bond in question mandates a creditor meeting. Below, we describe the
various anti-holdout provisions that have been adopted by sovereigns in the
post-2002 era. With respect to each, we also note the relevant reform being
suggested as part of the Euro CAC package. Our expectation for each of
these provisions is that if the provision (or a particular form of it) helps to
ameliorate the holdout creditor problem, its presence should reduce the cost
of capital.
6.1 THE MINIMUM VOTE TO MODIFY PAYMENT TERMS
The minimum vote required to modify payment terms in any given sovereign
bond issue varies considerably. This minimum vote can be as high as 100%
(in the case of the handful of issuers who still require unanimity) and as low
as 18.75% (for those issues containing diminishing quorum requirements).
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the variation in the minimum vote requirement for
New York law and English law bonds, respectively. Note the dramatic
change in the percentage of votes required for both jurisdictions in 2003.
But also note that, although the New York bonds decreased the percentage
requirement, the English law bonds for the most part increased the percent-
age requirement. The overall market standard is 75%. The Euro CAC
proposal decreases the market standard vote requirement from 75% to
66.67%.13
13 The vote requirement that we refer to in the text is that which is required with a written
resolution. If a physical meeting is held, there is a quorum requirement (66.67% of the
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An important aspect of our coding reflects the fact that when bonds
mandate that there be a meeting for any vote to take place, they tend to
contemplate the possibility of at least two meetings (a second meeting is held
if the necessary quorum is not met at the first meeting). The question then is
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Figure 5. Minimum percentage votes to modify payment terms in English bonds.
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Figure 4. Minimum percentage votes to modify payment terms in New York bonds.
outstanding bonds) and the required vote is 75% of the outstanding bonds, assuming the
quorum is met. See http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf.
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whether to code the vote required at the first or the second meeting. We use
the minimum vote required to obtain a change at the second meeting because
our understanding from market participants is that the second meeting is
generally the most relevant for a sovereign debtor that has dispersed bond-
holders. The recent Greek restructuring in March 2012 is illustrative. Even
though this was perhaps the most widely discussed sovereign restructuring in
recent history and Greece had effective control through its banks over a
large percentage of their own bonds, the necessary quorums could not be
achieved in a number of cases.14
We expect that, holding other things constant, spreads over the risk-free
rate should be positively correlated with the minimum modification vote for
a bond (a higher modification vote means a higher likelihood of holdout
problems).
6.2 MANDATORY MEETINGS
Prior to 2003, practically all English law bonds required formal meetings to
vote on changing the payment terms of outstanding debt issues.15 Figure 6
illustrates this change in practice. As the figure shows, the fraction of issuers
mandating meetings was close to 100% throughout the 1990–2002 period.
But then, starting in 2003, a number of issuers dispensed with the mandatory
meeting requirement altogether. By 2010, fewer than 50% of the English law
issuances contained mandatory meeting requirements. Euro CACs, while
allowing for vote modifications to take place at a meeting with quorum
requirements and so forth, do not mandate that a meeting take place. We
expect that a mandatory meeting is likely to increase holdout problems.
Therefore, bonds for which meetings are mandated (as opposed to
optional) should have a higher spread.
6.3 DISENFRANCHISEMENT CLAUSES
Given that under a unanimity rule each holder essentially has a veto right, no
holder has any reason to care about who the other holders are or how they
would vote for a restructuring plan. But, in the post-2002 era, with a super-
majority being able to impose its preferences on the other bondholders, the
issue of who is entitled to vote becomes of paramount importance. Thus,
14 Our thanks to Lee Buchheit, who was counsel for Greece during their restructuring, for
conversations on this issue.
15 Bonds written under New York law almost never include a mandatory meeting
requirement.
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an important aspect of any CAC provision is whether it contains a disen-
franchisement clause that bars certain bondholders from voting on
restructuring plans. It is important to note that unlike the shift away from
a unanimity rule, which was almost universal, there is variation in the types
of disenfranchisement strategies used. Some issuances have explicit provi-
sions that disenfranchise bonds owned or controlled by the issuers, whereas
others allow the issuer’s Central Bank to vote, and still others are silent as to
who can vote, suggesting that the issuer has the right to vote its own bonds
(Drake, 2012). Rational creditors presumably care about the specifics
included in disenfranchisement provisions. Figures 7 and 8 report the use
of disenfranchisement provisions in New York and English law bonds,
respectively.
The data in these figures show that, post-2002, there is considerable vari-
ation in the inclusion of disenfranchisement provisions under both sets of
laws. A larger fraction of New York law issuers have adopted disenfran-
chisement clauses than English law issuers, but the basic point is that starting
in 2003, an increasing number of issuers perceived a need to include these
clauses. As of 2010, over 50% of the bonds written under the two legal
regimes contain these clauses. Disenfranchisement provisions are part of
the model Euro CACs.
Disenfranchisement provisions do not lend themselves to a clear predic-
tion even under our holdouts-impose-costs model. On the one hand, their
presence worsens holdout problems because the sovereign cannot influence
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Figure 6. English law bonds requiring mandatory meetings.
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the vote using bonds it controls, which should increase spreads. On the other
hand, their absence means that the sovereign can vote to determine the fate
of its own restructuring; a sure invitation for misbehavior, which should also
increase spreads.
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6.4 AGGREGATION
In the post-2003 period, a small subset of New York issuers began including
aggregation provisions in their bond issues. These clauses go beyond the
basic 75% modification clause in terms of deterring holdouts. A concern
with a distressed debtor having a wide range of bonds issuances outstanding
with the 75% vote requirement is that a holdout could buy a 25% interest of
an issue and disrupt a restructuring proceeding. Aggregation provisions not
only contain a modification vote for each individual bond but also specify
provisions that govern the modification of the terms of all bonds outstand-
ing. For example, Argentina’s post-2002 bonds include a clause that states
that, if there is an overall cross-series vote by 85% of the outstanding bonds
approving a modification to payment terms, then it does not matter that an
individual bond did not meet the 75% threshold; the bondholders of all
issues are all bound so long as each bond issue garners at least 66.67%
approval. Only four nations (Argentina, the Dominican Republic,
Uruguay, and, most recently, Greece) have included this provision.16 The
Euro CACs contain an aggregation provision with a lower vote requirement
than prior users of aggregation under New York law, such as Uruguay and
Argentina, had used previously. The cross-series vote requirement for the
Euro CACs is 75% (as opposed to 85%), so long as every individual bond
garners at least a 66.67% vote in favor of the proposed modifications to
payment terms.17
Aggregation provisions are a form of super CACs in that they operate
across all of the sovereign’s bonds. Their presence should reduce spreads. It
is unlikely that we will be able to use our quantitative data to say anything
about the pricing impact of using aggregation, given the small amount of
data. However, we return to this issue when we discuss the parameters of
restructured debt.
Thus far, we have discussed only the variations in terms of modification
CACs. There were, however, a number of other changes—all of which also
relate to the issue of reducing the risks of holdout creditors—which both
English and New York law bonds adopted after 2002. The proposals for
these changes were generated in the debate over individual and collective
rights in the 1995–2003 period. However, the U.S. Treasury and other
Official Sector institutions had not, as best we know, put pressure on
issuers to adopt any of these supplementary anti-holdout provisions, for
example, acceleration, aggregation, and mandatory meetings. These
16 The Province of Buenos Aires also shifted to using aggregation provisions.
17 See http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf.
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supplementary anti-holdout provisions were simply part of the recom-
mended set of clauses that that came from a variety of sources (most prom-
inently, the G-10 expert group report released in 2002). As with the
disenfranchisement provision discussed earlier, there is variation in terms
of the adoption rates of these supplementary CACs, both in New York
and English law bonds. As with the 2002 U.S. Treasury initiative, the
2012 Euro CAC initiative gives less attention to these secondary CAC pro-
visions. A supplement to the report describing the model Euro CACs sets out
the basic CACs relating to acceleration and bondholder representatives, but
leaves it to the individual nations to decide whether to adopt them.18
6.5 ACCELERATION
Beyond the shift away from unanimity to a 75% vote that was driven by the
2002 U.S. Treasury initiative, the change that found the most adherents was
the move away from individual to collective action with respect to acceler-
ation rights. It had been the case that, upon the occurrence of an “Event of
Default” in a sovereign debt contract (e.g., the declaration of a debt mora-
torium by the issuer) individual creditors could accelerate all the future
payments that were owed to them to the current point in time. This right
is relevant to the holdout creditor problem because a holdout creditor’s
ability to interfere with a restructuring diminishes considerably if all that
it can do is to sue the debtor for the single unpaid coupon payment. In fact,
if the coupon payment is small, the debtor can pay the holdout creditor her
coupon payment and stop her efforts to interfere with a restructuring. On the
other hand, if the holdout can accelerate all of the promised interest and
principal, then she is more likely to sue. Post-2002, many issuers in both
England and New York included acceleration provisions requiring a 25%
vote before there could be an acceleration, thereby reducing the ability of
holdouts to accelerate their individual claims.
As Figures 9 and 10 reveal, some issuers, particularly those who issued
under New York law, implemented collective acceleration clauses as early as
the mid-1990s. The 2003 shift to modification CACs seems to have spurred a
further move toward acceleration provisions. As seen in these figures, there
is variation in the adoption rates for the two legal regimes. For New York
law bonds, the shift toward acceleration provisions appears to have started
much before 2003 and the U.S. Treasury’s initiative. In the English law
bonds, however, 2003 looks to be the starting point for the shift. By 2010,
acceleration provisions were being used by over 50% of the issuers under
18 See http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_supplemental_provisions.pdf.
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both sets of laws. Although not mandating the inclusion of collective accel-
eration provisions, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the model
Euro CACs mentions these clauses and collective reverse acceleration clauses
(discussed below) in an approving fashion. We expect that the presence of
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collective acceleration provisions (as opposed to individual acceleration pro-
visions) will reduce spreads.
6.6 REVERSE ACCELERATION
A subset of sovereigns have gone further still by including also a reverse
acceleration provision that allows for a 50% vote to reverse a 25% ac-
celeration clause in the event that a holdout creditor held a 25% block of
the issue. Thus, a reverse acceleration clause frustrates the holdout
creditor even if a single entity is able to acquire a 25% block of votes.
If the majority of creditors happen to be in the process of negotiating a
value-enhancing debt restructuring plan, the last thing they want is for a
holdout creditor to manage to get a 25% voting block and interfere with
the deal. Hence, for those bonds that contain a reverse acceleration pro-
vision, a 50% vote can reverse an acceleration attempt by a 25% block
holder.19
Figures 9 and 10 also present the frequency of adoptions of reverse accel-
eration provisions. Not surprisingly, the level of adoption of these clauses,
under both English and New York law, is correlated with the adoption levels
of the basic 25% acceleration provision (a reverse acceleration provision
without an acceleration provision would be pointless). However, it bears
reiterating that there is a small subset of issuers who use the acceleration
provision, but decided to forego the reversal option. We expect that the
presence of reverse acceleration clauses will reduce spreads.
6.7 COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION CLAUSES
Issuers have also attacked the holdout problem from a different direction by
either appointing trustees or putting in place provisions for a bondholder
representative committee. The typical sovereign bond lacks a bondholder
representative who can make decisions on behalf of the bondholders as a
group, including deciding whether to accelerate, when to sue and how to
share payments. Instead, sovereign bonds tend to rely on fiscal agents, who
attend to administrative matters (payments and such) on behalf of the issuer.
The problem of holdout creditors is further ameliorated through the ap-
pointment of a trustee who owes duties to the bondholders as a group and
19 A small handful of bonds use reverse acceleration provisions with a vote of 66.67% and
two bonds use a 75% vote. The 50% vote appears to have become the dominant standard
though.
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can block actions by subsets of bondholders that propose value-reducing
restructurings. Further, and this is a point relevant in the context of recent
vulture fund litigation against sovereigns, funds that are transferred to a
trustee are less vulnerable to attack by a holdout creditor because they are
now under the control of a creditor representative, who owes obligations to
all the creditors. By contrast, funds that are under the control of a fiscal
agent, awaiting disbursement, are technically controlled by the issuer’s rep-
resentative and are more vulnerable to litigation by holdouts.
A related modification clause that some bonds contain in the post-2002
period is a contractual mechanism to appoint and fund a committee to act
on behalf of the creditors as a group. These committees, which typically are
appointed only in the event of a payment crisis for the bond, also serve a
representative role that can thwart holdout creditors.
Figures 11 and 12 report the adoption of these two types of bondholder
representative provisions in New York law and English law bonds, respect-
ively. The figures show that these provisions were adopted by only a
minority of issuers under New York law, whereas they enjoyed greater popu-
larity in issues under English law.20 We expect that the presence of a trustee
or bondholder committee provision should reduce the issuing spread.
7. Empirical Analysis
We perform our empirical analysis on the New York law bonds and English
law bonds separately, so as not to have to account for the differences in the
two legal systems. We also separate New York law bonds from English law
bonds in our subsets of high-rated (investment grade) and low-rated (non-
investment grade) issuers.
20 The foregoing differences in adoption rates are interesting because they may be indica-
tive of differences in the two legal regimes. Bondholder representatives, by being designated
representatives, take on a set of legal obligations that the local regime specifies. These
obligations (often referred to in terms of a “fiduciary” duty) are not easy to contract
around. The patterns in Figures 11 and 12, therefore, may indicate that the legal system
in England, for some reason, provides a more conducive legal environment for the use of
trustees and bondholder committees. Again though, note that the shift begins around the
2002–03 mark, for both legal regimes. The supplementary memorandum accompanying the
model Euro CACs, while not expressing a preference for either the fiscal agency or trustee
structure, suggests that creditors’ individual rights to sue be constrained in favor of a
creditor representative (such as a trustee), should such a representative structure be
included in the bond in question.
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7.1 MINIMUM MODIFICATION VOTE
Recall that we defined the variable Vote as the minimum vote required to
alter the payment terms of an outstanding bond issue. Historically, the em-
pirical literature on sovereign debt has focused on a dichotomous variable
indicating the absence or presence of a CAC. In our full sample, Vote ranges
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from a high of 100% (the old-style New York requirement of a 100% vote to
change payment terms) to a low of 18.75% (the English-style diminishing
quorum requirement).
We expect that the higher the required vote percentage, the greater the
potential holdout problem, which would increase the costs of a restructuring,
and therefore lead to a higher offering spread. Bondholders would anticipate
the difficulty of changing the payments of a particular bond issue and would
require a premium commensurate with these anticipated costs should a
restructuring be necessary in the future. Thus, Vote should be positively
related to Spread—the higher the number of votes required to change
payment terms the greater the probability of holdout problems and therefore
the higher the issuing spread. In addition, the relation between Vote and
Spread should be greater for sovereigns more likely to encounter financial
difficulties in the future. Thus, we expect a stronger relation for low-quality
sovereigns (sovereigns with below investment grade debt) than high-quality
sovereigns (sovereigns with investment grade debt) and this expectation is
borne out by the data.
Table IX presents the results based on our sample of New York law bonds
from 1990 to 2011. All but one of the ratings variables in Table IX are signifi-
cant at the 1% level and all but one are monotonic. Our holdout ratings
category is BBB. Thus, the coefficients on all ratings above BBB are
negative, indicating a lower spread relative to the BBB rating, and all ratings
below BBB are positive. The coefficient on the number of banks (Bank) is
negative and significant, suggesting that the higher the number of banks the
broader the investor base and the greater the liquidity resulting in a lower
spread. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating a shelf registration
(Shelf) is significantly positive. Consistent with prior research (Bradley, Cox,
Gulati, 2010), this suggests that market participants anticipate that sovereigns
issue debt when they believe that themarket conditions are ripe for an offering.
In response to the asymmetric information possessed by the issuing sovereign,
investors will price-protect themselves and require a higher issue premium.
The primary result of interest in Table IX is the significantly positive
relation between Vote and Spread. This relation suggests that there is a
pricing penalty for bonds that face a higher risk of holdout problems (the
higher the value of Vote, the higher the risk of holdouts and the higher the
issuing spread). Put differently, the shift toward CACs—moving from a
unanimity regime to a 75% vote requirement—is associated with a reduction
in the spreads of New York law bonds. Since Vote is coded as decimals and
Spread is coded as percentages, the coefficient of 2.2 implies that a 1%
increase in the required vote percentage results in an increase of the
spread by 2 basis points (2.2/100). Thus, the effect of moving from a
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requirement of unanimity to one of 75% approval translates into a decrease
in the cost of capital of 55 basis points for all bonds written under New York
law and a decrease of 83 basis points for non-investment grade bonds.
The results of the subsets of investment grade and non-investment grade
bonds are consistent with the expectation that this shift is more important
for low quality sovereigns. Indeed, the sign on Vote is insignificantly negative
for the investment grade issuances, whereas the sign is significant and
positive for the non-investment grade bonds—reducing the required
Table IX. New York law bonds (1990–2011) OLS results
Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate on a
U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses
and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Shelf is equal to 1 if the offer is shelf registered and zero other-
wise. Vote is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the
payment terms of the bond. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5% level
and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Total Investment grade Non-investment grade
Ratings
AAA 1.485***
(0.356)
AA 1.939***
(0.266)
A 0.474
(0.290)
BB 1.192***
(0.280)
B 2.384***
(0.415)
Bank 0.072*** 0.182*** 0.047
(0.023) (0.531) (0.037)
Shelf 0.545*** 0.173 0.524*
(0.202) (0.365) (0.282)
Vote 2.243** 0.611 3.344***
(0.910) (1.203) (1.090)
Constant 0.38 3.113*** 0.750
(0.914) (1.053) (0.964)
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.27 0.118
Observations 294 107 186
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percentage reduces the spread demanded by investors. Again, as the depend-
ent variable (Spread) is defined in terms of percentages and the independent
variable (Vote) is defined in terms of decimals, the effect of a 1% increase in
the estimated number of votes needed to change payoff terms is the
estimated coefficient divided by 100. Given that the coefficient on Vote is
3.44 and significant, a 1% increase in Vote leads to a 3 basis points increase
in the when-issued spread. Thus, decreasing the voting requirement by 25
percentage points corresponds to a reduction in the spread of 86 basis points.
The signs and statistical significance of the control variables Bank and Shelf
are consistent with those of the whole sample.
Table X presents the result of adding yearly dummy variables for the post-
2002 period to the regression model. Although the estimated coefficient on
Vote is positive, it is not statistically different from zero (t¼ 1.12). This is to
be expected. As indicated in Figure 1, except for a few outliers the value of
Vote is a constant 1.0 from 1990 to 2002 and a constant of 0.75 from 2004 to
2011. It is therefore not surprising that yearly dummy variables would “ex-
plain” more than the essentially dichotomous variable Vote. The yearly
dummy variables account for more than the presence or absence of a
CAC. These variables also capture the state of the world economy in a
particular year, the prevailing and expected interest and exchange rates
and the stage of the current business cycle. Apparently, our use of spreads
relative to U.S. Treasury Bills, instead of the contracted yields, is insufficient
to capture the important international monetary and macro variables that
are manifested in this 8-year time period.
Note that the coefficient on Vote for the investment-grade subsample is
negative and statistically significant. Although we have no ready explanation
for this relation, it is inconsistent with the results reported in the literature
that CACs are beneficial for financially sound nations. These results suggest
the opposite. For this subsample over this period, the lower the number of
votes required for changing the pricing terms, the greater the spread for
investment grade bonds.
Figure 13 presents the time series of the mean average spreads for invest-
ment and non-investment grade bonds written under New York law from
1996 to 2011.21 As expected, the data show that the cost of debt (mean
annual spread) is higher for the below-investment grade sample. However,
note that the average spread for this sample begins to fall in 2003, which
corresponds to the advent of CACs. According to previous research, the
adoption of CACs by low quality countries should result in an increase in
21 We report data starting in 1996 because of the paucity of bonds issued prior to that date
(see Figure 1).
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the cost of debt or should produce no effect at all. As can be seen in the
graph, however, the average spread for the lower rated issuers begins to
decrease with the addition of CACs in 2003.
Figure 13 is particularly informative given the stability of bond ratings for
each country through time. There are 204 bonds issued by 42 sovereigns in
the 1990–2002 time period. Of these 42 sovereign issuers only 3 issued both
investment and non-investment grade bonds over this time period. Likewise
there are 222 bonds issued by 37 countries in the 2003–11 time period and
Table X. New York law bonds (1990–2011) includes yearly dummy variables for 2003–2011
OLS results. Dependent variable is the spread between the interest rate of the bond and the
rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the
pluses and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Shelf is equal to 1 if the offer is shelf registered and zero other-
wise. Vote is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the
payment terms of the bond. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5% level
and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Total Investment grade Non-investment grade
Ratings
AAA 1.378***
(0.311)
AA 1.797***
(0.300)
A 0.496*
(0.248)
BB 1.272***
(0.281)
B 2.723***
(0.387)
Bank 0.076*** 0.173*** 0.046
(0.022) (0.054) (0.037)
Shelf 0.537** 0.225 0.498
(0.211) (0.382) (0.299)
Vote 1.784** 1.986*** 1.933
(0.806) (0.664) (1.724)
Constant 4.298*** 4.550*** 2.152
(0.8914) (0.518) (1.713)
Adjusted R2 0.565 0.472 0.190
Observations 294 107 186
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only one country issued both investment grade and non-investment grade
bonds over this time frame. Finally, there are 29 countries that issued bonds
in both periods, and all but 8 issued exclusively either investment or below
investment grade bonds. These data underscore the stability of ratings over
time and the fact that ratings reflect the quality of the issuing sovereign
rather than a specific bond issue. For our purposes here, the data show
that sovereigns did not switch from one category to the other in these two
time periods.
Table XI is the regression counterpart to Figure 13. These data show that
the mean spread for non-investment grade bonds is significantly lower in the
post-2002 period, whereas mean spread of the investment grade bonds is
insignificantly lower in the latter period. It should be noted that in the
post-2002 period, 95% of the bonds in the sample contained a CAC,
whereas only 1% of the bonds in the sample contained a CAC in the
earlier period. These results suggest that the adoption of CACs in the
post-2002 period is associated with a decrease in the spreads of non-invest-
ment grade bonds, whereas the adoption had no effect on investment grade
bonds.
Table XII presents our results for the English law dataset for the 1990–
2010 period. The signs of the ratings coefficients are monotonic and signifi-
cant. The coefficients on the two control variables Bank and Amount (the log
0.0
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Figure 13. Mean annual spread New York law bonds.
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of the size of the issue) are not significant but do have the expected signs. The
coefficient on Vote is positive and significant for the entire sample. However,
while the coefficient on Vote is positive for the non-investment sample, it is
not statistically significant. This result is contrary to our expectations. Note
that we include dummy variables to account for the fact that some of the
English law bonds are denominated in Euros (Euro) and some in pounds
(Pound). Note also that since the English law bonds do not face an SEC-type
registration process, there is no issue of controlling for shelf offerings.
Table XIII adds yearly post-2002 dummies to the regression models in
Table XII. Contrary to our findings in the New York subsample, we see that
adding yearly dummy variables for the post-2002 period results in a signifi-
cant positive coefficient for Vote in the non-investment subsample, while the
coefficient on the investment grade subsample is insignificant. These findings
are consistent with our expectations.
It is important to appreciate that the results for the subset of bonds written
under English law is more relevant to our hypothesis than the results based
on the subset of bonds written under New York law. Recall that Vote is
essentially a dichotomous variable in the New York law subset, whereas
Vote is more like a continuous variable across the English law bonds.
Table XI. New York law bonds OLS regression
The dependent variable is the Spread between the issue rate and the U.S. Treasury rate. The
independent variables are the number of Banks participating in the issue, dummy variables
for investment grade and non-investment grade bonds and an interaction variable equal to 0
if bond was issued before 2002 and 1.0 if issued afterwards. t-Statistics are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10%
level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Rating¼ 1, if investment grade Rating¼ 1, if non-investment grade
Constant 4.26*** 2.21***
(19.43) (8.69)
Banks 0.10** 0.10**
(2.14) (2.47)
Rating 2.03*** 2.42***
(5.76) (6.94)
Ratingpost-2002 0.1 0.61
(0.35) (3.41)
Adjusted R2 36.78 38.09
Observations 333 333
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The foregoing results are based on bonds issued throughout the 1990–2010
period. Table XIV reports results for the sub-period 2003–10. Again we
report results for the New York law bonds and English law bonds separately
and present subsets of the two based on investment and non-investment
grade bonds. The results in Table XIV are consistent with our primary
Table XII. English law bonds (1990–2010)
OLS results. Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the
rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the
pluses and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Vote is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed
to change the payment terms of the bond. Amount is the log of the size of the issue. Euro
and Pound are dummy variables if the issue is stated in either currency. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the
10% level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Total Investment grade Non-investment grade
Ratings
AAA 1.696***
(0.525)
AA 1.426***
(0.534)
A 0.877
(0.680)
BB 0.447
(0.517)
B 1.752**
(0.792)
Bank 0.018 0.021 0.027
(0.013) (0.017) (0.026)
Amount 0.046 0.197 0.156
(0.105) (0.161) (0.404)
Euro 0.623* 0.006 0.725
(0.361) (0.238) (0.849)
Pound 0.985* 1.436***
(0.494) (0.434)
Vote 1.234* 0.162 1.816
(0.651) (0.694) (1.728)
Constant 2.307** 0.047 3.749
(0.707) (0.760) (2.657)
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.084 0.142
Observations 185 128 56
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expectation (a positive relation between Vote and Spread for low quality
sovereigns).
The coefficients on the ratings variables in the New York sample reported
in Table XIV are monotonic and all but one are statistically significant. The
Table XIII. English law bonds (1990–2010) includes yearly dummy variables for 2003–2010
OLS results
Dependent variable is the spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate on a
U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses
and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Shelf is equal to 1 if the offer is shelf registered and zero other-
wise. Vote is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the
payment terms of the bond. Amount is the log of the size of the issue. Euro and Pound are
dummy variables if the issue is stated in either currency. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10%
level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Total Investment grade Non-investment grade
Ratings
AAA 1.778***
(0.516)
AA 1.368***
(0.401)
A 0.546
(0.361)
BB 0.811***
(0.395)
B 2.428***
(0.631)
Bank 0.011 0.000 0.098**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.043)
Amount 0.330** 0.166 0.343
(0.1262) (0.109) (0.414)
Euro 0.567** 0.197 0.563
(0.275) (0.1913) (0.752)
Pound 1.098*** 1.546***
(0.381) (0.314)
Vote 0.798 0.035 3.007**
(0.641) (0.725) (1.434)
Constant 3.774*** 1.727** 2.086
(0.937) (0.629) (2.482)
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.432 0.398
Observations 185 128 56
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signs of the control variables Bank and Shelf are as expected, although
neither is statistically significant. Importantly, the sign on the coefficient
for Vote is positive and significant for the non-investment grade subset.
For the English law bonds, all but one of the coefficients on ratings are
monotonic and all but two are statistically significant. The coefficient on
Vote for the non-investment grade subset is positive but not statistically
significant.22
Table XIV reports results for the sub-period 2003–10. Again we report
results for the New York law bonds and English law bonds separately and
present subsets of the two based on investment and non-investment grade
bonds. The results in Table XIV are consistent with our primary expectation
(a positive relation between Vote and Spread for low quality sovereigns).
Table XV reports the results of adding yearly fixed effects to the regression
models in Table XIV. As is the case for the entire sample period, adding
yearly dummy variables to the New York law sample from 2003 to 2010
results in an insignificant coefficient on Vote. However, as was the case with
the longer period, adding yearly fixed effects to the sample of English law
bonds results in a positive and statistically significant relation between Vote
and Spread.
The estimates of the relation between Vote and Spread, in the regressions
in which the relation is significant, range between 2 and 5, which translates
into an increase in the spread of 2 to 5 basis points. Given that the most
frequent change in our database is from 1.0 to 0.75, the data suggest that the
advent of CACs coincided with an increase in spreads of below investment
grade bonds of between 0.5 basis points and 1.25 basis points, which is
certainly economically significant.
By and large, the findings reported above are at odds with the findings of
the prior generation of empirical studies on CACs. Those studies find that
modification CACs (the shift from unanimity votes to something less) had
either a zero price effect or that they lowered spreads for the high-rated
nations and increased the spreads for the low-rated sovereigns. The implica-
tion being that shifting to a lower vote requirement either made no difference
or increased the costs of borrowing for the weaker nations. Based on those
results, it is surprising that any low-rated nation was willing to shift away
from unanimity provisions. Yet, they did, en masse. With the caveats
22 A caveat is in order regarding the results in Table XIV. Although the positive relation
between Vote and Spread for the non-investment New York subsample is consistent with
our basic hypothesis, there are only 4 observations that are different from 75%, and 3 of
the 4 bonds are issued by the same country (Brazil). The value of Vote for these observa-
tions is 85%. Consequently, we do not include the variable Vote for New York bonds in
subsequent analyses, as this would essentially create two constants in the regressions.
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Table XIV. New York law and English law bonds (2003–2011) OLS results
Dependent variable is the spread between the interest rate of the bond and the rate on a
U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the pluses
and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Shelf is equal to 1 if the offer is shelf registered and zero other-
wise. Vote is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the
payment terms of the bond. Amount is the log of the size of the issue. Euro and Pound are
dummy variables if the issue is stated in either currency. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10%
level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent
variables
New York law bonds English law bonds
Total
Investment
grade
Non-investment
grade Total
Investment
grade
Non-investment
grade
Ratings
AAA 2.459***
(0.648)
AA 2.077*** 2.066***
(0.293) (0.721)
A 0.382 1.493
(0.346) (0.955)
BB 1.225*** 0.775
(0.303) (0.754)
B 1.628*** 0.720
(0.325) (0.907)
Bank 0.027 0.195*** 0.025 0.0676* 0.045 1.197***
(0.022) (0.051) (0.014) (0.035) (0.052) (0.247)
Shelf 0.155 0.655 0.036
(0.194) (0.395) (0.259)
Amount 0.043 0.494 0.540
(0.163) (0.298) (0.941)
Euro 0.571 0.064 1.594*
(0.418) (0.532) (0.820)
Pound 1.474* 0.319
(0.810) (0.367)
Vote 3.739** 0.812 14.18*** 1.471 0.294 4.867**
(1.405) (1.791) (2.004) (0.928) (0.78) (1.712)
Constant 0.695 0.036 7.356*** 2.541** 1.485 5.684
(1.163) (0.259) (1.585) (1.107) (1.294) (6.225)
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.311 0.060 0.393 0.097 0.256
Observations 154 57 97 102 68 34
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Table XV. New York law and English law bonds (2003–2011) yearly fixed effects
OLS results. Dependent variable is the spread between the interest rate of the bond and the
rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Ratings are taken from S&P with the
pluses and minuses being combined with the lettered ratings. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Shelf is equal to 1 if the offer is shelf registered and zero other-
wise. Vote is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the
payment terms of the bond. Amount is the log of the size of the issue. Euro and Pound are
dummy variables if the issue is stated in either currency. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10%
level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent
Variables Total
New York Law Bonds English Law Bonds
Investment
Grade
Non-Investment
Grade Total
Investment
Grade
Non-Investment
Grade
Ratings
AAA 2.635***
(0.612)
AA 1.873*** 2.496**
(0.320) (0.934)
A 0.487 0.910*
(0.301) (0.449)
BB 1.298*** 0.010
(0.243) (0.626)
B 2.018*** 1.614***
(0.255) (0.566)
Bank 0.039* 0.136** 0.006 0.009 0.018 0.962***
(0.0192) (0.055) (0.027) (0.041) (0.040) (0.251)
Shelf 0.061 0.008 0.220
(0.219) (0.527) (0.307)
Amount 0.493*** 0.157 0.806
(0.172) (0.169) (1.407)
Euro 0.821** 0.550* 1.991
(0.350) (0.298) (2.472)
Pound 0.305 1.042***
(0.656) (0.244)
Vote 1.517 1.772 3.160 1.064 0.050 7.093**
(1.245) (1.965) (3.504) (0.805) (0.892) (2.707)
Constant 0.643 1.408 4.768 4.292*** 0.330 2.448
(0.934) (1.491) (3.504) (1.052) (0.964) (8.571)
Adjusted R2 0.582 0.662 0.325 0.703 0.523 0.502
Observations 154 57 97 102 68 34
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discussed in the last section of the article, our results may begin to provide an
explanation for the observed behavior.
Our results suggest that the markets, and the advocates of CACs, might
have been right to abandon the unanimity requirement. For the post-2002
period, we find that CACs are associated with lower spreads for weaker
nations. We attribute this diminution of the spreads for low-quality
countries to the fact that restructurings are easier and cheaper when the
required vote thresholds for modifications of payment terms are lower.
We now turn to other aspects of modification clauses that as yet have not
been explored in the literature. Because of the slight (near zero) variation in
these contract provisions prior to 2003, we concentrate on the post-2002
period.23 Moreover, most of these additional covenants are present in
bonds written under English law, whereas, even where they are present,
there is little to no variation in these provisions for bonds written under
New York law. Consequently we present data only for the English law
bonds and discuss any relevance for New York bonds in the text.
7.2 ADDITIONAL COVENANTS
7.2.a. Meeting
As discussed in the Introduction, prior studies involving comparisons of the
spreads on English law and New York law bonds ignored an important
feature of English law bonds—namely mandatory meetings. This feature
requires that a vote to change the payment terms of an outstanding issue
has to take place at an actual, physical meeting of the bondholders. Such a
requirement might hinder reorganization efforts by sovereigns for two
reasons. First, it would be costly in terms of time and out-of-pocket
expenses for bondholders to gather in a particular location to hold such a
vote, particularly if the bondholders were scattered throughout the world.
Second, the fact that bondholders were required to meet face-to-face might
actually exacerbate the holdout problem since such a gathering would make
coordination among bondholders easier. Bondholders might collectively
agree to hold out rather than accept a reduction in their principle or
interest. Thus, we hypothesize that a meeting requirement would increase
the spread on sovereign debt issues.
The requirement of a meeting is primarily found in English law CACs.
Moreover, almost all English law CACs prior to 2003 included mandatory
23 Unreported, for the tests discussed in the remainder of the paper, is the impact of
controlling for a time trend in the 2002–11 period. The introduction of a time trend does
not change our basic results.
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meetings. Consequently, we focus on English law bonds from 2003 to 2010
to examine the effects of this variable on the cost of capital. For the reasons
explained earlier, we use the votes required at the second meeting, assuming
that a meeting is mandated.
7.2.b. Disenfranchisement
The second variation in the modification CACs that we examine is the use of
disenfranchisement provisions. There are two dynamics that are possible
with disenfranchisement provisions, and both have the effect of reducing
spreads. The first is based on the conventional explanation for why creditors
want disenfranchisement provisions. An issue with any collective action pro-
vision is its vulnerability to vote manipulation. That is, the issuer might be
tempted to park its bonds with sympathetic entities who would then vote in a
manner contrary to the interests of the other creditors. For example,
Ecuador threatened as much in its restructuring in 2009 (Drake, 2012).
Given this concern, one would expect creditors to demand, and issuers to
provide, provisions that protect against vote manipulation.
Second, disenfranchisement provisions might also help protect against a
debtor that is reluctant to restructure. Recall that the CAC initiatives, both
in the U.S. a decade ago and today in the Eurozone, were driven by the
Official Sector. Recall also the premise that debtor states are often reluc-
tant to restructure because of the political costs to the leaders (they fre-
quently lose their jobs). Disenfranchisement provisions, therefore, can not
only help protect private creditors against the risk of issuer manipulation
of the vote in favor of a restructuring, they can also help protect the
Official Sector against the risk of issuer manipulation of the vote against
a restructuring.
Consistent with the foregoing, many issuers began including disenfran-
chisement provisions after 2002 (Figures 7 and 8). These provisions typic-
ally specify that issuers are barred from voting bonds that they “own or
control”. However, not all issuers made this shift. Some provided no anti-
manipulation protections to their creditors, even after the shift to collective
action.
Creditors, we hypothesize, would charge less to issuers willing to constrain
themselves against the temptation to manipulate the vote. Creditors should
also want to constrain the politicians of the debtor state from unnecessary
and costly delays to a restructuring, if it is clear that there is a solvency
problem. Further, these effects should be higher for weaker issuers since
they, by definition, face a higher risk of financial distress.
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7.2.c. Acceleration/reverse acceleration
The ability to accelerate debt obligations upon the occurrence of an “Event
of Default” is a significant weapon in a holdout creditor’s hands.
Acceleration clauses permit a bondholder to demand the receipt of all
future interest payments as well as the payment of principal. Absent the
power to accelerate, litigation becomes a decidedly less attractive propos-
ition. Pre-2003, the vast majority of issuances under both English law and
New York law granted the right of acceleration to the individual bond-
holder. Post-2002, many of these issuers moved to requiring a 25% vote
for an acceleration to occur (a small subset moved to 10%). The shift was
nowhere near as uniform as the move in the New York law bonds away from
unanimity for modification CACs. But, as Figures 7 and 8 show, well over
50% of the issuers in both jurisdictions move from individual rights to ac-
celeration to collective ones. In addition, most of these issuers also put in
place Reverse Acceleration provisions to protect against the possibility that a
holdout might gain a 25% stake. In that case, a 50% vote of the creditors (in
principal amount) would have the power to reverse or negate the initial vote
to accelerate.24
Consistent with our hypotheses, we conjecture that the use of collective
acceleration provisions should have a spread reducing effect, and that this
effect should manifest itself more in the subset of offerings by weaker issuers.
7.2.d. Collective representation clauses
CRCs consolidate authority for key decisions in the hands of either a com-
mittee or a bondholder representative, such as a trustee. Standard practice in
sovereigns bonds, in the post-World War II era, has been to use Fiscal
Agents. These institutions, as a formal matter, are agents for the issuer.
They perform administrative functions related to the bond, such as
ensuring that payments are made at the appropriate places and in the ap-
propriate currencies. Decisions as to important matters, such as whether to
demand acceleration or to initiate a lawsuit against the debtor, tended to be
allocated to the individual bondholder. Among the range of proposed
changes to standard contracting practices that were made in the aftermath
of the Mexican crisis in 1995 and the subsequent Asian crisis, was that sov-
ereign bonds shift to a model that used collective representatives—agents
who had responsibilities toward the bondholders as a group and were
delegated the authority to act in the best interests of the collective (a
24 A handful of issuers have used higher vote thresholds for Reverse Acceleration, such as
66.67% and 75%.
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mandate that would most likely entail acting in a manner adverse to any
creditor who was seeking a holdout premium).
Two types of CRCs began to emerge in the post-2002 period; a Trustee
provision and a Bondholder Committee provision. The former is a perman-
ent representative for the bondholders who is present through the life of the
bond; effectively the Trustee substitutes for the Fiscal Agent. The latter
typically is appointed only in the event of a crisis situation. As shown in
Figure 11, unlike the shift away from unanimity and the move toward ac-
celeration provisions, only a small number of issuers implemented CRCs
under New York law. However, as shown in Figure 12, more than half of
the issues written under English law between 2004 and 2011 adopted these
provisions. Because of the small numbers, we cannot test the effects of the
two types of CRCs individually. We report, therefore, the results for a
consolidated CRC variable. Our hypothesis is that the move toward collect-
ive action (here, a CRC) will have a spread reducing effect for the subset of
bonds issued by weaker issuers.
Table XVI presents the results of our examination of the effects of these
additional contract features on the cost of sovereign debt written under
English law. In the interest of space, we report data based only on the
below-investment grade sample. Nothing is lost by presenting only the
results for the below-investment grade sample since none of these covenants
have a significantly statistical relation to the Spreads in the investment grade
sample.
Column 1 in Table XVI reproduces the results reported in Table XII.
Again, consistent with our perspective, there is a positive and statistically
significant relation between Spread and Vote, but only for the non-invest-
ment grade sample. As stated above there is no relation between Vote and
Spread in the investment grade sample. These results are consistent with our
view of the effects of CACs on issue spreads.
In the next four columns, we add the additional contract terms and an
interaction term with Vote. The reason it is important to examine the inter-
active effect is that these additional provisions operate in conjunction with
the primary CAC variable, Vote. In other words, they literally interact with
it in terms of their effect on holdouts. In column 2 we add the independent
variable Meet which is an indicator variable that equals one if a meeting of
bondholders is required to change payment terms and an interaction term
with Vote. The coefficient on Meet is negative and statistically significant.
This implies that the requirement of a meeting correlates with a lower cost of
capital. This is contrary to what we had predicted at the outset; which was
that the meeting requirement would correlate with a greater difficult in
tackling holdouts. What is important to see, however, is that the coefficient
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on the interaction term is positive, statistically significant, and more than
twice the estimated coefficient on Meet. Thus, the net effect (when the two
coefficients are added together) is a positive relation, which implies that a
higher vote requirement increases spreads, when a meeting is required.
In the next column, we entertain the indicator variable for the presence of
a disenfranchisement clause Disen and the relevant interaction term. Neither
the coefficient on Disen nor the coefficient on the interaction term is statis-
tically significant, although the coefficient on our primary independent
variable Vote is positive and statistically significant. The third column
in Table XVI includes the dummy variable ACC & RVC, which indi-
cates the presence of an acceleration or a reverse acceleration clause and
the interaction variable. Not only is our primary variable Vote positive and
statistically significant, but the interaction term is significantly negative,
which indicates that including these clauses reduces the when-issued interest
rate, presumably because they reduce the costs of the holdout problem.
Finally, the last column includes the dichotomous variable CRC and an
interaction term with Vote. Although the estimated coefficients on both our
primary variable Vote and the interaction term are negative, neither is stat-
istically different from zero. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction
term is positive, statistically significant and the point estimate is greater
than the sum of the coefficients on Vote and CRC. These results suggest
that contrary to our expectations, including CRC clauses actually increases
the when-issued Spread for below investment grade bonds.
Table XVII reproduces Table XVI but with the inclusion of yearly fixed
effects. As is the case with a number of results reported in this study, the
addition of fixed effects reduces the statistical significance of all of the inter-
action variables except for a weak positive relation between CRC and
Spreads, which is inconsistent with our previous speculation.
To summarize, the relation between the ancillary CAC terms and spreads
seems complex. Our results suggest that these terms have important inter-
active effects with the Vote variable, but we have just scratched the surface of
identifying those effects.
8. Restructured Issues
Our analysis up to this point has been based on an unbalanced panel of
issuances by a number of countries over two decades. We focused on the
market reactions to issuances across time and across countries, which is
to say across the spectrum of countries in varying financial conditions.
An alternate approach would be to conduct a time-series analysis that
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Table XVI. Non-investment grade English law bonds 2003–2010
OLS results. Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the
rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Amount is the log of the size of the issue. Euro is a dummy
variable which is 1 if the terms of the bond are stated in Euros and zero otherwise. Vote
is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the payment terms
of the bond. Meet equals 1 if a formal meeting is required to vote and zero otherwise. Disen
is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the bond contains a disenfranchisement clause. ACC/
RVC is equal to 1 if the bond contains an acceleration or a reverse acceleration clause. CRC
is set equal to 1 if the bond contains a CRC. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10% level,
**Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent
Variables Vote Meeting Disen ACC&RVC CRC
Bank 1.197*** 0.040 0.512 0.073 0.063
(0.247) (0.061) (0.072) (0.055) (0.073)
Amount 0.540 0.589** 0.995 0.132 0.906
(0.941) (0.248) (0.625) (0.327) (0.508)
Euro 1.594* 0.887 1.401* 1.065 1.432
(0.82) (0.607) (0.645) (0.951) (1.01)
Vote 4.867** 1.342 7.221** 8.366*** 2.801
(1.712) (2.762) (2.880) (1.710) (3.113)
Meet 2.529***
(0.763)
MeetVote 6.585**
(2.580)
Disen 0.721
(1.347)
Dis vote 3.051
(4.229)
ACC and RVC 1.394
(1.063)
ACC and RVCVote 6.092**
(2.236)
CRC 1.704
(0.975)
CRCVote 8.901**
(2.833)
Constant 5.684 0.614 4.994 0.235 2.247
(6.225) (1.975) (4.483) (2.386) (3.352)
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.609 0.514 0.582 0.563
Observations 34 33 33 33 31
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Table XVII. Non-investment grade English law bonds 2003–2010 fixed effects
OLS results. Dependent variable is the Spread between the interest rate of the bond and the
rate on a U.S. Treasury bond with the same maturity. Bank is the number of banks
participating in the offer. Amount is the log of the size of the issue. Euro is a dummy
variable which is 1 if the terms of the bond are stated in Euros and zero otherwise. Vote
is the minimum percentage of votes by dollar amount needed to change the payment terms
of the bond. Meet equals 1 if a formal meeting is required to vote and zero otherwise. Disen
is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the bond contains a disenfranchisement clause. ACC/
RVC is equal to 1 if the bond contains an acceleration or a reverse acceleration clause. CRC
is set equal to 1 if the bond contains a CRC. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *Significance at the 10% level,
**Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level.
Independent variables Vote Meeting Disen ACC & RVC CRC
Bank 0.098** 1.007** 0.003 0.005 0.040
(0.043) (0.386) (0.094) (0.090) (0.098)
Amount 0.343 0.510 0.797 0.137 0.585
(0.414) (1.161) (0.648) (0.441) (0.625)
Euro 0.563 0.131 1.797** 0.964 1.676*
(0.752) (2.386) (0.763) (1.142) (0.915)
Vote 3.007** 17.510 6.061** 7.468** 2.258
(1.434) (22.41) (2.772) (3.037) (3.445)
Meet 11.860
(16.84)
MeetVote 11.880
(23.360)
Disen 0.128
(1.032)
DisVote 1.781
(3.335)
ACC & RVC 1.600
(1.290)
ACC & RVCVote 4.829
(3.129)
CRC 2.097
(1.194)
CRCVote 7.817*
(3.607)
Constant 2.086 11.770 3.775 0.159 0.130
(2.482) (16.71) (4.472) (3.145) (4.075)
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.609 0.714 0.734 0.772
Observations 56 33 33 33 31
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examines whether the impact of using CACs changes when a country shifts
from being a high-risk issuer to a low-risk issuer or vice versa. As a practical
matter, this is difficult because the ratings of countries—our measure of
risk—rarely change. Further, even if such a shift occurs, we could conduct
our analysis only if the country issues bonds after the shift in risk level.
An exception to the foregoing is the small set of cases in which a country
restructured its debt after it has defaulted on its creditors.25 Not only does
the nation’s risk level change significantly (it has just defaulted), but also it
will generally issue new bonds to exchange for the outstanding old ones.
Important for our purposes, the contract terms of the new bonds will
reflect the nation’s downgraded status because these are terms negotiated
with a set of creditors who have just been asked to take reductions in principal
or interest or an extension of the maturity date and, in most cases, all three.
Focusing on the subset of nations that have done restructurings in the
post-2002 period, we seek to determine whether these countries, in the wake
of their defaults/restructurings, altered their contract terms.26 Finding that
these countries shifted away from a 75% vote to alter payment terms toward
a unanimity provision would call into question our basic thesis and prior
results. By contrast, finding that these sovereigns moved toward weaker
individual rights and stronger collective and third-party rights would be
consistent with the dynamics observed in our empirical results.
Broadly speaking, we have examined three types of CACs—modification
CACs, acceleration provisions, and CRCs. Consequently, we seek to deter-
mine what type of CACs, if any at all, the issuers in our subsample of
restructured bonds adopted.
The sample of issuers in our dataset that have restructured in the post-
2002 period is small—comprising only 13 issuances. One of the restructuring
countries, Dominica, issued its post-restructuring bonds under the laws of
Trinidad and Tobago, which makes a comparison of the post-restructuring
terms with a market standard difficult because there is no market standard
for Trinidadian sovereign bonds. Another country, St. Kitts & Nevis, wrote
its post-restructuring issuance under its local law, which creates similar
problems of comparisons. Of the remaining 11 restructurings, 9 were
issued under New York law and 2 under English law.
25 We use the term “default” in the credit rating sense of the word in this section, rather
than a formal legal default.
26 Because the set of nations that have done sovereign restructurings is small and data
relatively easily available, we have attempted to utilize all of the information available until
the date of this writing (August 2013). As of this writing, Belize, Grenada, and Jamaica are
in the process of conducting restructurings. However, there is not enough information
available on any of these deals yet.
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The issuers are Uruguay, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Belize,
Grenada, Congo, Ivory Coast, Seychelles, Iraq, the Province of Buenos
Aires, and Greece. Our examination of the restructured bonds of these 11
defaulted sovereign issuers can be summarized as follows.
8.1 MODIFICATION CACs
The restructured issuances in our sample follow the dominant post-2002
practice of incorporating a 75% vote requirement. The exception is
Greece, the most recent (and biggest) restructurer. The new bonds have a
66.67% requirement to change payment terms.
The key difference we find in the subset of restructured bonds is that the
bonds contain aggregation provisions, which as described earlier, is an ag-
gressive form of CACs that almost no other issuers use. Five of the 11
issuers—Argentina, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, the Province of
Buenos Aires, and Greece, include aggregation provisions. No other
issuers use these types of provisions.
8.2 DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Disenfranchisement provisions protect investors against the temptation of
the issuer to act opportunistically by placing bonds in the hands of sympa-
thetic parties. Over 50% of issuers in the post-2002 period shifted to using
disenfranchisement provisions. In our sample of restructured bonds though,
10 out of the 11 issuers included disenfranchisement provisions. More im-
portant, 7 of these 11 issuers utilized enhanced disenfranchisement provi-
sions that are not seen elsewhere in the market. The standard provisions
prohibit the issuer from voting bonds that it owns or controls. The
problem with the standard provision though is that it has no mechanism
by which the creditors can find out which bonds are problematic. The
enhanced disenfranchisement provisions that 7 of the 11 of the issuers in
our post-default sample use creates a monitoring mechanism, in that the
issuer is required to report to the trustee, prior to any vote, the fraction of
bonds that are to be stricken from the voter rolls. No other issuers in our
sample use these types of provisions.
8.3 ACCELERATION/REVERSE ACCELERATION
The 11 issuers in our sample follow the dominant industry norm in terms of
having acceleration/reverse acceleration clauses. As discussed earlier, the
post-2002 era saw a significant number of nations (roughly 60%) move
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away from individual acceleration rights towards a collective right (25% for
acceleration; 50% for reversal). In our sample of restructured issuances,
100% have moved to using the 25/50 collective right for acceleration and
reverse acceleration. Overall, the pattern is as we saw with the earlier vari-
ables. The post-restructuring issuers are more aggressive adopters of CACs
than the other issuers in the market.
Note also that 2 of these 11 restructurers go beyond the emerging market
standard of a 50% reverse acceleration vote and utilize instead a 75% reversal
vote requirement (for payment accelerations only; for non-payment matters,
the reversal vote is still 50%). Once again we see that these post-restructuring
deals not only adopt the emerging market standards for CACs more aggres-
sively than their less risky counterparts, but also they are ahead of the
curve in terms of designing innovations that might make CACs even more
effective.
8.4 COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION CLAUSES
In our broader sample of sovereign bonds under New York and English law,
trustee provisions are the least frequently used CAC. Fewer than 10% of the
issuances under either English law or New York law use these provisions. In
the subset of restructured bonds, however, 100% of the issuers use trustee
provisions. Further, as we saw earlier in our discussion of disenfranchise-
ment, the obligations of the trustees in a number of these post-restructuring
bonds are enhanced.
Overall, the patterns are consistent. We find evidence that restructured
bonds contain more, not less, aggressive CACs, which is consistent with our
overall thesis that weaker issuers and their creditors benefit from the inclu-
sion of CACs.
8.5 REMOVAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO SUE
The final and perhaps the most significant change in these restructured
bonds is a form of CAC that has received almost no attention in the litera-
ture. Almost every sovereign bond allows an individual the right to sue. If
the issuer fails to pay a creditor her coupon payments, she is allowed to sue
at least for the amount that has not been paid. One might ask why does this
individual right matter, given that the issuer can typically obtain a change of
the payment terms with a 75% vote. The right matters because it is the rare
sovereign issuer that foresees a financial crisis and does an anticipatory
restructuring, without ever defaulting (Uruguay’s 2003 restructuring being
one of these rarities). For the most part, governments delay admitting that
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they might have to restructure until the last possible moment, and then
default. Only then do they begin talking about a restructuring. At that
point, having defaulted, they are vulnerable to lawsuits by bondholders,
unless this right has been taken away by features in the debt contract.
This right of an individual to sue is mandated by statute for U.S. corporate
bonds, and is considered by many as sacrosanct. In 5 of our 11
post-restructuring bonds, however—Granada, Belize, Congo, Ivory Coast,
and Greece—there is a prohibition of the individual right to sue (unless the
trustee fails in its obligation to pursue the interests of the creditors; in which
case the right reverts to the individual). This innovation is found in no other
sovereign bonds that we are aware of.
8.6 THE TRENDS IN CORPORATE VERSUS SOVEREIGN RESTRUCTURINGS
It is interesting to pause and note the opposite trends in the reorganizations
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and sovereign restructurings.
There is research that suggests that over the past decade Chapter 11 reorgan-
izations have evolved from a pro-debtor process to a pro-creditor process.27
During the past decade, creditors with senior, secured claims have come to
dominate the Chapter 11 process. Courts are less inclined to permit
managers to control the firm through the reorganization process by
granting access to debtor-in-possession financing. In this modern era,
more than 70% of CEOs are replaced within 2 years of the bankruptcy
filing which is an increase over historical averages. This same literature
documents a dramatic increase in asset sales and liquidations throughout
the reorganization process.
In contrast, the results reported in this study, and reflected in the
Table XVIII, suggest that sovereign reorganizations have become more
pro-debtor over time. A possible rationale for this trend is the recognition
that short of armed conflict or asset seizures, creditors cannot compel
debtors to honor their debt obligations. Thus, the only means of inducing
sovereigns to meet their financial commitments is to facilitate restructuring
by reducing the major obstacle to an orderly process, which we contend is
the potential holdup problem.
9. Conclusion
The goal of this article is to generate empirical evidence that sheds light on
the effect that the use of CACs by Eurozone sovereigns issuing under foreign
27 See Ayotte and Morrision (2009) for a review of this literature.
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law will have on their cost of capital. Although we examine the effects of a
number of clauses contained in CACs, our main focus is on the number of
bondholders required to change the payment terms of an existing debt in-
strument. It is our perspective that by allowing a majority of a sovereign’s
creditors to alter the payment terms of a bond and impose a restructuring
plan on any minority holdout creditors, CACs reduce the costs of any third-
party restructuring, which in turn reduces the cost of capital as measured by
its when-issued interest rate.
Contrary to much of the existing literature, we find that the presence of a
CAC in a sovereign bond issue is associated with a lower, not higher, cost of
capital, especially for financially weak issuers. We document a fall in the cost
of capital for bonds written under New York law beginning in 2003, which
corresponds to the almost universal adoption of CACs by these sovereigns.
Moreover, and consistent with the above thesis, this fall is due exclusively to
the reduction of the rate for below-investment grade bonds. Indeed, we find
that the advent of CACs over this time period had no measurable effect on
the rates for investment-grade bonds written under New York law. The
empirical results of our analysis of English law bonds are even stronger.
We find a significant positive relation between spreads and the number of
votes required to change the payment terms.
In terms of the ancillary covenants, we find some support for our notion
that impediments to a speedy reorganization increase the cost of capital. The
requirement of creditor meetings increases spreads the more votes required
to change payment terms. Also, the inclusion of acceleration and reverse
acceleration clauses are associated with lower issuance spreads.
At first blush, our general results present somewhat of a conundrum. If
the degree of effectiveness of a CAC reduces the cost of capital for below
investment grade bonds, then why would these sovereigns not include them
in their covenants voluntarily? And specifically in the Eurozone context, why
have the authorities felt the need to mandate the use of CACs with lower
Table XVIII. The shift toward CACs
New York law bonds (%) English law bonds (%)
1992–2002 2003–2012 1992–2002 2003–2012
Unanimity requirement to alter payment 94.81 2.71 1.94 0.00
Disenfranchisement provisions 1.13 77.23 6.76 45.11
Collective acceleration provisions 55.26 82.57 25.88 72.52
Trustee/bondholder committee provisions 4.37 16.58 13.29 62.16
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vote thresholds than the status quo? Our conjecture is that CACs are being
mandated by the Official Sector because the officials anticipate (expect) that
the bonds of certain nations at least will likely have to be renegotiated prior
to their maturity and the officials want to make this process more efficient
(lower cost). Clearly, no small part of this strategy is due to the fact that the
Eurozone is both a monetary and trade union. As such, it recognizes the
possibility externalities that would befall other member nations if one
member defaulted. The contagion effect throughout the European banking
system could be catastrophic and might threaten the very viability of the
Euro as a common currency. This same argument may also provide an ex-
planation for why Euro area countries could not be depended on to adopt
the model Euro CACs voluntarily (remember that these Euro CACs have
lower vote requirements than the types of CACs ordinarily used). After all,
one of the key purposes of the Euro CACs, as made explicit by policy offi-
cials themselves, was to send a signal to the markets that there would be
private sector involvement (or “PSI”) in the future (Gelpern and Gulati,
2013). Individual nations (and their creditors) would presumably prefer to
avoid PSI and take a full bailout instead.
By contrast, perhaps the almost universal voluntary adoption of CACs by
New York law bonds in 2003 reflects the absence of a monetary union. In
other words, there was (is) no central authority that stands ready to bail out
these countries should they experience an “event of default.” As the chances
of a complete bailout of most of the countries issuing in the New York
market are slim to none, it is in their interest to reduce the costs of a
restructuring by including CACs.
Before concluding, a few caveats regarding our results bear noting. First,
our assumption and the assumption in much of the literature has been that
the introduction of CACs would translate into a reduced likelihood of bail-
outs. After all, that is how CACs have been sold to the public—as a means to
ensure PSI in bailouts. However, the experience with Greece, and particu-
larly its EUR 130 billion bailout package in March 2012 suggests a different
dynamic for why CACs might reduce borrowing costs instead of increasing
them. Greece was told by the Official Sector (the richer Eurozone nations
and the IMF) that it would only receive its bailout if it obtained a significant
haircut from private creditors (Ekathimereni, 2012). Greece, therefore, had
to retrofit modification CACs into its local-law bonds so that it could
engineer its restructuring.28 Under this dynamic, CACs, and the attendant
PSI, might even raise the likelihood of a bailout because they make it more
28 Although we do not have concrete information on the recent restructuring by St. Kitts
and Nevis, press reports suggest that it was probably required to obtain a substantial
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likely that the richer nations will be able to sell the need for the bailout to
their taxpayers if a defaulting sovereign and its creditors bear some of the
pain.
Second, most previous CAC studies, in addition to focusing on data from
a different period of time (pre-2002), focused exclusively on the portion of
the vote continuum between unanimity and something below that. In
contrast, our study examines a lower portion of the voting continuum as
well. In particular, for the English law bonds, the range that we examine is
between 75% and 18.75% (with the complications of mandatory meetings at
the lower end of the spectrum). It is this lower portion of the voting spectrum
that is most important in the contemporary context though, because the
unanimity requirement has almost completely disappeared from foreign-
law sovereign bonds. Unfortunately our empirical analysis tells us nothing
about what happens at even lower ends of the spectrum (and without the
complications of mandatory meetings). Other research and logic suggests
that at the very low ends, where the vote is so low that the sovereign can
basically do whatever it wants, investors show a clear preference for bonds
that impose some constraint on the sovereign. This was illustrated by the
Greek restructuring of 2012 where the local law aspect of the vast majority of
its bonds was viewed as giving the Greek sovereign carte blanche to modify
the bonds at will. In that context, investors showed a clear preference for
bonds that had a higher effective voting requirement than zero (Choi,
Gulati, Posner, 2011; Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, Gulati, 2013).
Third, although we believe that we have advanced the scholarship in this
area by parsing the variations in contract language, we have not examined all
of the variations found in sovereign debt contracts. Although many of these
contract provisions are assumed to be boilerplate, some variations still exist.
Unreported here, we tested our results in regressions that included controls
for the presence or absence of the basic negative pledge clause, which is
perhaps the most important covenant in these contracts other than the
CACs themselves.29 However, the variation is not sufficient to cause vari-
ations in issue rates. We also examined other key terms such as the waiver of
sovereign immunity, and while there is a small amount of variation here as
well, the variation had no statistically significant effect on spreads.
Fourth, it has been suggested to us that the markets may have “learned”
from the experience of Argentina’s 2001 default. Those bonds lacked CACs.
amount of PSI (which it did, utilizing the CACs in its bonds) before it could avail itself of
an IMF program (Cotterill, 2011).
29 Negative pledge clauses prevent the issuer from issuing debt that is senior to the claims
of existing creditors.
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As of this writing, 10 years later, holdout litigation over those bonds con-
tinues. Learning from the Argentine experience might explain the difference
in pricing results between our study and prior studies. Along these lines, the
past 10 years have also seen the first five instances in which CACs have been
utilized successfully (Uruguay, Seychelles, Belize, Greece, and St. Kitts &
Nevis).
Fifth, 2012 witnessed what might well be the biggest victory by holdout
creditors against a sovereign in the case, NML vs. Argentina, decided by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York in October 2012. The full
implications of the case have yet to be seen because the matter is under
appeal. Nevertheless, commentators suggest that this case has the potential
to alter the landscape of sovereign debt restructurings; that is, unless CACs
counteract the effects of the ruling (something that the court in NML vs.
Argentina suggested they would). In other words, the importance of CACs
in sovereign bonds, starting in 2013, may be enhanced.
Sixth, more important than our pricing results, demonstrating the
dramatic increase in the usage of these provisions, particularly modification
CACs, over the past decade may be our most valuable contribution to the
sovereign debt literature. The data in Table XVIII illustrate this trend over
the past decade—a trend that appears to be continuing as the reforms
contemplated for the Eurozone countries push further in the direction of
collective action provisions, which we believe will result in decrease in the
cost of capital, especially for financially weaker sovereigns.
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